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Abstract 
The accuracy of simple actions is swiftly determined through specific monitoring brain 
systems. However, it remains unclear whether this evaluation is accompanied by a rapid and 
compatible emotional appraisal of the action that allows to mark incorrect actions as 
negative/bad and conversely correct actions as positive/good. In this study, we used a new 
method to decode the affective value of simple actions generated by participants during a 
standard Go/noGo task. Immediately after each Go/noGo action, participants responded to 
the valence of either a positive or a negative word. Results showed that False Alarms 
performed during the Go/noGo task led to a faster evaluative categorization of negative 
words relative to positive words. This action - word evaluative priming effect occurred when 
the interval between these two events was set to either 300 or 600 ms, but not 1000 ms. 
Finally, higher levels of trait anxiety were associated with a reduction of the evaluative 
priming effect. Our results suggest that simple actions are rapidly evaluated as positive or 
negative depending on the automatic monitoring of their perceived accuracy. 
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Evidence for the automatic evaluation of self-generated actions 
Human beings constantly and effortlessly categorize external stimuli in their environment 
as good or bad. This function is adaptive because it enables us to unlock rapidly appropriate 
behavioral responses, for example to approach a positive stimulus or avoid a negative 
stimulus (Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993; Chen & Bargh, 1999; Neumann, Förster, & 
Strack, 2003). Evidence for automatic evaluative processing has been obtained in evaluative 
priming studies (De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 1998; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & 
Kardes, 1986; Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 1994). Evaluative priming refers to the fact 
that reaction times (RTs) for categorizing the valence of a target word (e.g., “cold”) are 
shorter when it is preceded by a prime with the same valence (e.g., “cancer”) than when it is 
preceded by a prime with a different valence (e.g., “happy”). Given that there is very little 
time between the onset of the prime and the onset of the target (typically less than 300 ms) 
and participants are asked to ignore the primes, these results suggest that the valence of the 
prime is processed automatically in the sense of rapidly and unintentionally. Evaluative 
priming has already been observed for a wide range of external stimuli in the environment, 
including words (Fazio et al., 1986), pictures (Hermans et al., 1994), black and white line 
drawings (Giner-Sorolla, Garcia, & Bargh, 1999), motivationally-relevant stimuli (i.e., 
rewarded and unrewarded colors; (Moors & De Houwer, 2001), odors (Hermans, Baeyens, & 
Eelen, 1998) and tones (Reber, Haerter, & Sollberger, 1999). 
Presumably, automatic evaluation is a generic function and does not only concern external 
stimuli in the environment, but also self-generated actions. Actions in response to stimuli are 
usually deemed conducive or obstructive depending on their actual match with goals stored in 
long term memory (Scherer, 1984, 1988). Indirect evidence supporting this view comes from 
recent psychophysiology studies showing that unwanted response errors (i.e., goal obstructive 
events) yield larger skin conductance responses and greater heart rate deceleration than 
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correct decisions (Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003b), as well as a larger startle 
potentiation (Hajcak & Foti, 2008) and differential early activation in the amygdala (Pourtois 
et al., 2010). These results suggest that errors may be perceived as aversive events, and 
accordingly be associated with enhanced arousal within the autonomic nervous system. It has 
also been shown that through conditioning, a specific action (e.g., a key press) can become 
aversive as evidenced by the fact that the selection of the action is faster by the presence of an 
irrelevant negative word (Beckers, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2002). Although these studies give 
first hints on the acquired emotional value of specific actions, they do not inform us about 
whether valence specific effects can be obtained as a function of the perceived goal 
conduciveness of simple self-generated actions. Earlier studies showed that physiological 
measures such as startle potentiation reflect not only valence but also arousal 
(Vansteenwegen, Crombez, Baeyens, & Eelen, 1998). Moreover, it is likely that the post-
error detection changes in autonomic or brain activity that were observed in previous studies 
merely reflect enhanced arousal (Hajcak & Foti, 2008) or attention orienting (Notebaert et al., 
2009) rather than a genuine affective marking of these actions as negative events. 
Accordingly, it remains to be shown more directly whether response errors and correct 
responses are processed “online” along a genuine evaluative dimension, eventually allowing 
a negative value to be mapped onto errors and conversely a positive value onto correct 
responses. Evaluative priming is generally regarded as a task that allows one to capture 
online evaluative reactions (e.g., De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2010; 
Fazio, 2001) and thus could provide unique information about this issue. 
Earlier event-related potential (ERP) studies have also provided evidence for an early 
emotional processing of errors following their onset (Luu, Collins, & Tucker, 2000), as well 
as for an early differential appraisal of errors compared to correct hits (Aarts & Pourtois, 
2010; Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2004). Moreover, it has been found that early brain 
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responses related to error detection are typically enhanced in high trait anxious individuals. 
This neurological evidence is, however, also limited in that the observed neurophysiological 
effects were most often not accompanied by detectable affect-related changes in the behavior 
in these earlier studies (Hajcak & Foti, 2008; Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003a; Hajcak 
et al., 2004). Hence, it is unclear whether overactive early error-related brain activities 
(including the ERN) seen in high anxious participants reflect a general impairment in 
cognitive control or action monitoring, or alternatively, a selective difficulty in ascribing 
“online” a negative value to response errors. Furthermore, these earlier studies focussed 
mainly on response errors. Hence, much less is known about a possible symmetric affective 
tagging of correct actions as positive events by generic internal action monitoring brain 
systems. In other words, it still needs to be determined at the behavioral level whether 
incorrect actions are automatically categorized as negative events relative to correct actions, 
while conversely correct actions would implicitly be associated with positive emotions, 
relative to response errors. 
We addressed this question using a novel experimental paradigm suited to decode online 
the emotional value of simple self-generated actions performed during a standard Go/noGo 
task by healthy adult participants. Participants performed a speeded Go/noGo task (Vocat, 
Pourtois, & Vuilleumier, 2008), which was combined with an evaluative word categorization 
task. Unbeknown to participants, actions performed during the Go/noGo task (either correct 
or incorrect responses) served as primes whereas the words (positive or negative) were used 
as targets. In line with the logic underlying evaluative priming effects, we predicted that the 
time needed to categorize a target word would be systematically influenced by the putative 
valence of the preceding action, the latter being presumably decoded rapidly following or 
even during action execution in specific cognitive and emotion control systems (De Bruijn, 
de Lange, von Cramon, & Ullsperger, 2009). More precisely, we expected participants to be 
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faster to categorize a target word as negative if the preceding action was incorrect and to 
categorize a target word as positive if the preceding action was correct. Our prediction was 
based on the idea that self-generated actions are appraised quickly as being either goal 
conducive or goal obstructive events. Appraisal theories of emotion imply that, in the former 
case, a positive value or valence is generated, while in the latter case, a negative valence is 
temporarily activated (Scherer, 1988). In this framework, errors automatically evoke a 
negative reaction because they mismatch with the goals set out by the task.  
Figure 1. 
 
We also examined some of the functional properties of automatic evaluation of correct and 
incorrect actions. More specifically, we tested whether the effect was moderated by the time 
between the action and the target word and by the affective disposition of the participants. 
Previous studies with word primes and word targets reported reliable evaluative priming 
effects with a short stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) between prime and target (i.e., 300 
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ms or less) but not with long SOAs (e.g., 1000 ms; see Fazio et al., 1986; De Houwer et al., 
1998; Hermans et al., 1994). Based on these results, it was concluded that the automatic 
evaluation of words is a fast acting automatic process. In our first two experiments, the length 
of the SOA between the self-generated action and the presentation of the target word was 
constant and set to 300 ms. It was increased to 600 ms in Experiment 3 and to 1000 ms in 
Experiment 4. If the evaluation of correct and incorrect actions is also a fast acting automatic 
process (see Pourtois et al., 2010, for converging neuroscientific evidence) then evaluative 
priming should be observed at short (300 ms) but not long (1000 ms) SOAs.  
Because high anxious individuals are typically more sensitive and reactive to negative 
information (including errors), one might predict a stronger association between the (online) 
monitoring of response errors and negative emotion words in these individuals. However, in a 
recent ERP study, Aarts and Pourtois (2012) observed that high anxious individuals exhibited 
a selective deficit in relating the valence of external evaluative feedback (positive or 
negative) to the value of their self-generated actions (correct or incorrect), as shown by 
amplitude changes at the level of the FRN component. More specifically, high anxious 
participants did not show a normal amplitude variation of the FRN (time-locked to the 
evaluative feedback) as a function of the perceived “correctness” of their actions (Aarts & 
Pourtois, 2012). Therefore, we predicted that trait anxiety might actually decrease the size of 
the evaluative priming effect, bearing in mind that this effect is assumed to depend upon an 
automatic and fast affective marking of self-generated actions (responses errors/bad vs. 
correct responses/good) and this specific process that may be impaired in high anxious 
participants (Aarts & Pourtois, 2010).  
Method 
Participants 
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Twenty-one first-year female undergraduate psychology students (Age: M = 18.52; SEM = 
0.40; Range = 17 - 25) participated in Experiment 1. Fifteen undergraduate students (14 
women; Age: M = 21.4, SEM = .38, Range = 18 - 23) took part in Experiment 2. Twenty-two 
undergraduate students participated in Experiment 3 (19 women; Age: M = 21.73; SEM = .50, 
Range = 19 - 28). Finally, 20 undergraduate students took part in Experiment 4 (18 women; 
Age: M = 23.05, SEM = .86, Range = 18 – 26). All participants were right-handed, native 
Dutch speakers who did not have a history of neurological or psychiatric disease and had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The study was approved by the local ethics committee. 
All students participated in exchange for course credits or for money (10 Euro). 
Stimuli 
In the Go/noGo task, visual stimuli consisted of an arrow (subtending 11.4◦ ×0.05◦ of 
visual angle at a 60 cm viewing distance), that was presented in the center of a white 
homogenous background, and oriented either upward or downward (see Figure 1). The arrow 
was first black, and could then turn either green or turquoise. These two colors were matched 
for luminance. These different combinations of color and orientation were used as cues in the 
Go/noGo task. 
In the evaluative categorization task, targets were 30 positive and 30 negative words, 
either nouns or adjectives (see Table 1), and were selected from the Dutch affective rating list 
of Hermans and De Houwer (1994). T-tests showed that these positive and negative words 
differed significantly on the affective dimension, t(58) = 36.57, p < .001,ηp²= .95, but not on 
the familiarity dimension, t < 1, nor with respect to the number of letters, t < 1. Because 
actions functioned as primes, we also made sure that the list of positive target words did not 
contain more action-related words than the list of negative target words (one and two action-
related words, respectively).  
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Table 1.  
Target words selected from the Dutch affective rating list of Hermans and De Houwer 
(1994) 
Positive targets Negative targets 
Hawaii (Hawaii) trouw (fidelity) ruw (rude) stank (stench) 
engel (angel) lente (spring) haat (hate) drugs (drugs) 
goud (gold) baby (baby) moord (murder) virus (virus) 
regenboog (rainbow) parfum (parfume) aids (aids) puist (pustule) 
bruid (bride) knuffel (hug) vals (false) zweer (sore) 
applaus (applause) feest (part) pijn (pain) oorlog (war) 
hemel (heaven) oprecht  (sincere) dief (thief) kanker (cancer) 
geboorte (birth) zomer (summer) dood (dead) hitler (hitler) 
vrede (peace) humor (humor) graf (tomb) geweren (guns) 
spel (game) bloemen (flowers) sluw (sly) ongeval (accident) 
geschenk (gift) omhelzing (embrace) hoer (hore) brutaal (impudent) 
cadeau (present) vakantie (holiday) koud (cold) vulgair (vulgar) 
trots (proud) droom (dream) zwak (weak) ongezond (unhealthy) 
melodie (melody) leven (life) spin (spider) hatelijk (hasty) 
romantiek (romanticism) liefde (love) vuil (dirty) vijandig (hostile) 
 
Procedure 
Participants performed a standard speeded Go/noGo task (Vocat et al., 2008) interleaved 
with a visual word categorization task (see Figure 1). Actions performed during the speeded 
Go/noGo task actually served as primes whereas words were deemed targets in analogy with 
a conventional prime-target sequence during evaluative priming. After a practice block 
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including 24 trials, the experiment was divided into 3 main sessions, each starting with a 
training block (containing 28 trials: 20 Go and 8 noGo trials), followed by two test blocks 
(each containing 72 trials: 48 Go and 24 noGo trials). Note that participants were unaware 
that training blocks were actually used as calibration blocks to compute a RT limit (see 
further) in order to evaluate speed during the two following test blocks. Trial presentation 
was randomized within blocks. Between blocks, a small break (no longer than 5 min) was 
introduced. The whole experiment included 540 trials and lasted on average 50 min. Stimulus 
presentation and response recording were controlled using E-prime software (V2.0., 
http://www.pstnet.com/products/e-prime/). 
In this task, each trial started with a fixation cross that lasted for 500 ms. Afterwards, a 
black arrow, either oriented up or down, was presented at the position previously occupied by 
the fixation cross. After a variable interval ranging from 1000 ms to 2000 ms, the black arrow 
became either green or turquoise while its orientation could either remain identical or shift in 
the opposite direction compared to the initial black arrow. When the black arrow turned green 
and the orientation remained unchanged, participants were instructed to press a pre-defined 
button of the response box as fast as possible with the index finger of their left hand (Go trials 
– 66% of all trials). However, participants had to withhold responding when either the arrow 
became green but changed orientation, or when the arrow became turquoise and kept its 
initial orientation, enabling two noGo trial types (33% of all trials). Instructions emphasized 
both speed and accuracy, such that not only accuracy, but also the speed of the responses was 
later evaluated as being correct or incorrect.  
For each trial, speed was evaluated using an individually calibrated RT limit computed 
during a training block that preceded each session of two test blocks. This limit was thus 
calculated and updated three times in total (before Blocks 1 and 2 – Session 1, before Blocks 
3 and 4 – Session 2, and before Blocks 5 and 6 – Session 3). This allowed us to deal with 
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unspecific learning effects over time and maintain a similar number of correct and incorrect 
responses throughout the experiment. For the first session, the upper limit was set to 70% of 
the mean RT from the first training block. For the two subsequent sessions, this upper limit 
was updated and set to 80% of the mean RT during the respective training block. Hence, this 
procedure required participants to respond at least 30% faster (first session) or 20% faster 
(second and third sessions) on Go trials than their average speed during the respective 
training block. This procedure ensured a sufficient number of response errors on noGo trials 
and allowed us to distinguish between Fast Hits (i.e., responses on Go trials that were emitted 
more quickly than the individually-titrated RT limit) or Slow Hits (i.e., responses on Go trials 
that took longer than the RT limit). Errors were formally defined as overt responses on noGo 
trials (i.e., FAs), while correct inhibitions corresponded to withheld responses on the same 
noGo trials. 
Three hundred milliseconds after an action was executed, a target word was presented. 
The same 300 ms SOA was used in Experiment 2 because this experiment was mainly run to 
provide a replication of the results obtained in Experiment 1. The SOA was set to 600 ms in 
Experiment 3 and to 1000 ms in Experiment 4 in order to assess whether an evaluative 
priming effect was sensitive to the time elapsed between prime (action) and target (word). 
For correct inhibitions, the target word was presented 1500 ms after the presentation of the 
colored arrow plus the length of the SOA. Participants were instructed to categorize the 
valence of the target word (positive or negative) as fast and as accurately as possible by 
pressing one of two predefined keys of the response box using their dominant hand. Hence, 
the evaluative word categorization task was executed with a different effect or than the 
Go/noGo task. The target word remained on the screen until the participant responded or 
3000 ms elapsed. In order to balance the presentation of positive vs. negative words 
following Fast Hits, Slow Hits, Correct Inhibitions, and FAs, the target word that was 
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presented following an action was selected randomly on each trial. After the word 
categorization, participants received feedback informing them about their accuracy for the 
two consecutive tasks. A feedback screen was given to participants after each individual trial. 
It included general feedback (accuracy and speed) on the go/nogo task (top of the screen) and 
feedback (accuracy) on the subsequent emotion word task categorization task (bottom of the 
screen) (see Figure 1). The feedback for the Go/noGo task indicated whether the performed 
action was correct (and fast enough), incorrect, or too slow, while the feedback for the word 
categorization could be either that the response was correct or incorrect. Both feedback 
signals remained on the screen for 2000 ms. 
Accuracy and RTs (correct responses) for the evaluative word categorization task were 
analyzed using repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) as a function of (i) the 
valence of the target word (either positive or negative) and (ii) the type of action (FA, Fast 
Hit or Slow Hit) preceding word presentation. We did not include in these analyses RTs and 
errors for target categorization when a response on noGo trials was correctly inhibited 
because no overt (Go) action was performed in this condition. Note that on noGo trials, the 
interval between the start of the presentation of the noGo stimulus and start of the 
presentations of the target word was at least 1800 ms (1500 ms presentation of the noGo 
stimulus plus the length of the corresponding SOA; 300 ms, 600 ms or 1000 ms). Given that 
evaluative priming effects are typically observed only at short SOAs (i.e., less than 1000 ms; 
e.g., Fazio et al., 1986), we did not expect to find a significant evaluative priming effect 
following the correct rejections. Additional statistical analyses confirmed that the evaluative 
categorization was not influenced by these preceding correct inhibitions as the speed to 
categorize negative words did not differ significantly from the speed to categorize positive 
words (all Ts < 1 in Experiments 1-4). 
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After completion of the three experimental sessions, the Dutch version of the trait 
version of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (Defares, van der Ploeg, & 
Spielberger, 1979; Spielberger, 1983) was filled out by the participants. 
Results 
In all four experiments, trials with RTs shorter than 150 ms or longer than 500 ms in the 
Go/noGo task were discarded, as were trials in which the RT on the evaluative categorization 
task exceeded 2.5 SD from the mean RT per condition (see Table 2). Two participants 
(female) were not included in the statistical analyses of the data of Experiment 4 because they 
did not commit sufficient (i.e., minimum 10) FAs to compute reliable accuracy or RT 
estimates for each condition separately (i.e., positive words following FAs vs. negative words 
following FAs). Hence, in Experiment 4, only the data of the remaining 18 participants were 
included in the analysis. 
 
Table 2.  
Percentages outlier trials in the Go/noGo task (< 150 ms or > 500 ms) and in the evaluative 
categorization task (< or > than RTs ± 2.5 SD) 
  Exp 1 Exp 2 Exp 3 Exp 4 
Criterium Condition M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM 
< 150 ms FAs 4.25 1.27 3.02 0.87 5.78 1.33 6.63 2.21 
 Fast Hits 6.69 2.02 4.47 1.76 9.34 2.40 10.44 4.33 
> 500 ms FAs 3.04 1.71 0.90 0.32 2.37 1.36 2.81 0.97 
 Slow Hits 6.45 1.11 3.73 1.23 7.90 1.92 7.16 1.08 
> or <than Negative 2.89 0.21 2.91 0.22 5.60 1.13 3.30 0.21 
RTs ± 2.5 SD Positive 2.82 0.15 3.10 0.28 3.30 0.76 3.38 0.19 
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Evaluative Categorization Task 
 Speed. 
We first performed an omnibus ANOVA on correct RTs (i.e. correct word categorization 
responses) collected across the four experiments to verify that the categorization of the target 
word was reliably influenced by the putative affective value of the preceding action, only 
when a short (Experiments 1-3) but not long SOA (Experiment 4) was used between these 
two events. This analysis confirmed a significant three-way interaction between action type 
(FA, Fast Hit or Slow Hit), word type (positive or negative) and SOA (300, 600 or 1000 ms), 
F(4, 146) = 3.96, p < .01, ηp² = .10. In a second step, we performed an ANOVA on the mean 
RTs for correct word categorization responses, for each experiment separately. 
In Experiment 1, the ANOVA revealed a significant interaction effect between action type 
(FAs, slow Hits, fast Hits) and word type (positive or negative), F(2, 40) = 13.51, p < .001, 
ηp²= .40. This interaction resulted from faster evaluative categorizations when the valence of 
the word was congruent with the putative affective value of the action. More specifically, 
RTs for negative words following FAs were shorter compared to RTs for positive words 
following FAs, t(20) = -2.57, p < .05, ηp²= .25, while symmetrically, participants tended to 
categorize positive words faster compared to negative words when they followed Fast Hits, 
t(20) = 1.81, p = .08, ηp²= .14. Following Slow Hits, no significant RT difference emerged 
between negative and positive words, t < 1. The main effect of word type was not significant, 
F < 1. By contrast, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of action type, F(2, 40) = 
26.04, p < .001, ηp² = .57, reflecting longer RTs for words following FAs compared to words 
following either Fast Hits, F(1, 20) = 30.00, p < .001, ηp² = .60, or Slow Hits, F(1, 20) = 
30.25, p < .001, ηp² = .60, an effect in line with a systematic post-error slowing (Danielmeier 
& Ullsperger, 2011; Rabbitt, 1966). Because this general RT slowing following FAs 
compared to Fast Hits might lead to an artificial increase in evaluative priming for FAs 
Evaluation of actions 15 
 
compared to Fast Hits, we also analyzed log transformed RTs. This analysis confirmed a 
significant interaction effect between action type and word type, F(2, 40) = 16.41, p< .001, 
ηp²=.45. RTs for negative words following FAs were shorter compared to RTs for positive 
words following FAs, t(20) = -2.23, p = .04, ηp²= .20, while participants categorized positive 
words faster compared to negative words when they followed Fast Hits, t(20) = 3.71, p < 
.001, ηp² = .41. Shorter RTs were also observed for words following Fast Hits compared to 
Slow Hits, F(1, 20) = 6.10, p < .05, ηp² = .23 (see Figure 2A). 
An identical interaction effect between action type and word type was found in 
Experiment 2, F(1, 28) = 13.60, p < .001, ηp² = .49 (negative vs. positive words: FAs: t(14) = 
-3.28, p < .01; Fast Hits: t(14) = -2.51, p < .05, ηp² = .43), and Experiment 3, F(2, 42) = 
14.62, p < .001, ηp² = .41 (negative vs. positive words: FAs: t(21) = -8.74, p < .01, ηp² = .29; 
Fast Hits: t(14) = 12.31, p < .005, ηp² = .37), but not in Experiment 4, F < 1. Also no effect of 
word type was observed for Experiments 2-4 (Experiment 2: F(1, 28) = 2.02, p > .10, ηp² = 
.13; Experiment 3: F(1, 42) = 1.56, p > .10, ηp² = .07; Experiment 4:F < 1, ηp² = .02) while 
the post-error slowing effect was observed in all experiments (Experiment 2: F(2, 40) = 
26.80, p < .001, ηp² = .66; Experiment 3: F(2, 42) = 5.13, p < .05, ηp² = .20; Experiment 4: 
F(2, 34) = 15.49, p < .001, ηp² = .48; see Figure 2BCD). 
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Figure 2. 
 
 Accuracy. 
We first performed an omnibus ANOVA on the accuracy data collected across the four 
experiments. This analysis showed a significant three-way interaction between action type (3 
levels), word type (2 levels) and SOA (3 levels), F(4, 146) = 2.91, p < .05, ηp² = .07. In a 
second step, we performed an ANOVA on the percentage correct word categorization 
responses, for each experiment separately. 
In Experiment 1, the ANOVA performed on accuracy data (i.e., % correct responses) 
revealed a significant interaction between action type (FA, Fast Hit, Slow Hit) and word type 
(positive, negative), F(2, 40) = 6.05. p< .01, ηp² = .23. This interaction indicated that 
participants were less accurate to categorize positive compared to negative words following 
FAs, t(20) = 2.81, p < .05, ηp² = .28. Accuracy was similar for categorizing positive and 
negative words following either Fast Hits, t(20) = -1.38, p >.10,ηp² = .09, or Slow Hits, t(20) 
= -1.01, p > .10, ηp² = .05. Furthermore, the main effect of action type approached 
Evaluation of actions 17 
 
significance, F(2, 40) = 3.00, p = .06, ηp² = .13, indicating higher accuracy following Fast 
Hits compared to FAs, F(1, 40) = 7.58, p < .05, ηp² = .28 (see Table 3). Finally, the main 
effect of word type was not significant, F < 1. 
A similar interaction between action type and word type was observed in Experiment 2, 
F(1, 28) = 14.39, p < .001, ηp² = .51, and Experiment 3, F(2, 42) = 14.62, p < .001, ηp² = .41, 
but not in Experiment 4, F(1, 34) = 1.63, p > .10, ηp² = .09. Also, a similar effect of action 
type was observed in Experiments 2-4 (Experiment 2: F(2, 28) = 4.17, p < .05, ηp² = .23; 
Experiment 3, F(2, 42) = 9.28, p < .001, ηp² = .30; Experiment 4, F(2, 34) = 8.17, p = .001, 
ηp² = .33). A significant effect of word type was observed in Experiment 2, F(1, 28) = 6.11, p 
< .05, ηp² = .30 and Experiment 3, F(1, 42) = 6.56, p < .05, ηp² = .24, with less accurate 
categorizing for negative compared to positive words. This effect was not observed in 
Experiment 4, F(1, 34) = 1.63, p > .10, ηp² = .09 (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. 
Go/noGO task 
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We determined the percentage of action types (FA, Fast Hit, Slow Hit) made during the 
Go/noGo task, as well as the speed with which these responses were made. The analysis 
performed on the percentage of action types revealed a significant main effect of action type, 
F(2, 40) = 12.22, p < .001, ηp² = .38. The percentage of FAs was similar to the percentage of 
Fast Hits, t < 1. However, participants made significantly less Fast Hits than Slow Hits, t(20) 
= -4.61, p < .001, ηp² = .52. As expected, a significant main effect of action type was also 
observed for speed, F(2, 40) = 275.36, p < .001, ηp² = .93. RTs for Slow Hits were longer 
than RTs for Fast Hits, t(20) = -24.37, p < .001, ηp² = .97, while RTs for FAs were shorter 
than RTs for Slow Hits, t(20) = 3.14, p = .005, ηp² = .94, but longer than RTs for Fast Hits, 
t(20) = -17.38, p < .001, ηp² = .33 (see Table 4). A similar main effect of action type on the 
percentage of actions and speed was also observed in Experiments 2-4 (see Table 3). 
Table 3. 
Mean percentage (%), latencies (ms) and effect sizes related to the type of action 
during the Go/noGo task. 
   Exp 1 Exp 2 Exp 3 Exp 4 
Percentage FAs M 40.34 41.99 42.86 31.87 
  SEM 4.39 3.98 4.24 3.61 
 Fast Hits M 39.42 28.55 38.67 37.18 
  SEM 2.29 3.87 3.11 3.38 
 Slow Hits M 60.57 71.45 61.33 62.82 
  SEM 2.29 3.87 3.11 3.38 
 Effect of action ηp² .38*** .63*** .31*** .51*** 
 FA vs. Fast ηp² .00 .29* .02 .06 
 FA vs. Slow ηp² .43*** .68*** .54*** .72*** 
 Fast vs. Slow ηp² .52*** .69*** .39** .46** 
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Speed FAs M 234.7 222.40 223.78 229.00 
  SEM 5.33 2.66 4.62 5.69 
 Fast Hits M 221.77 204.93 209.25 223.50 
  SEM 6.34 5.76 7.23 8.32 
 Slow Hits M 307.50 276.60 286.51 301.61 
  SEM 7.02 3.80 8.32 8.12 
 Effect of action ηp² .93*** .91*** .60*** .88*** 
 FA vs. Fast ηp² .33*** .44** .36** .06 
 FA vs. Slow ηp² .94** .96*** .85*** .90*** 
Note.* p< .05, ** p< .01, *** p< .001 
 
Relation between trait anxiety levels and the magnitude of the evaluative priming effect 
To put to the test our third prediction, we assessed whether levels of trait anxiety of our 
participants (STAI-T all: M = 36.93; SEM = 1.50; median split - STAI-T low: M = 28.23; 
SEM = .90; STAI-T high: M = 44.00; SEM = 1.84) were related to the size of the evaluative 
priming effect. To address this, for each participant of Experiments 1-3 (i.e., all experiments 
in which a significant evaluative priming effect was found), the magnitude of evaluative 
priming was calculated as the difference in RT between incongruent action-word pairs (i.e., 
FA–positive and Fast Hit–negative) and congruent action-word pairs (i.e., FA–negative and 
Fast Hit–positive). The larger this difference score, the higher the influence of the preceding 
affective value of the action on the current evaluative categorization. Using a standard 
Pearson coefficient correlation analysis, we found across participants of Experiments 1-3 a 
significant negative correlation between levels of trait anxiety and these evaluative priming 
scores, , r = -.28, p < .05 (see Figure 4). This correlation showed that participants with higher 
levels of trait anxiety had a smaller evaluative priming effect. When including the non-
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significant evaluative priming results of Experiment 4 in this analysis, the correlation was no 
longer significant, r = -.19, p > .10. 
 
 
Figure 4. 
 
 
 
Discussion 
The results of our experiments reveal that simple self-generated actions during a speeded 
Go/noGo task are swiftly evaluated along a negative-positive dimension. This internal 
appraisal influences the valence categorization of an immediately following target word, even 
though these two different and non-overlapping events (i.e., action and word) belong to two 
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clearly separated tasks performed with two different effectors. Our findings have several 
important implications that we address below.  
Affective value of the action primes evaluative categorization 
We are the first to report evaluative priming effects that are triggered by the putative 
affective value which is rapidly and in an online manner assigned to self-generated actions 
(correct vs. incorrect) via an internal meta cognitive feedback mechanism (Fernandez-Duque, 
Baird, & Posner, 2000; Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). These evaluative 
priming effects suggest that FAs were evaluated as more negative compared to Hits (either 
Fast or Slow, see results of Experiments 1-3) while Fast Hits were evaluated as more positive 
compared to FAs (see results of Experiments 2-3). Therefore, the added value of our 
evaluative priming method is that it enables to access a fast valence tagging process that 
operates during action monitoring, as opposed to reactive arousal or attention effects 
following error detection for example. As such, our behavioral results go beyond earlier 
studies showing that different psychophysiological reactions, like larger skin conductance 
responses, greater heart rate deceleration and larger startle potentiation usually follow 
incorrect compared to correct actions (Hajcak & Foti, 2008; Hajcak et al., 2003b). The novel 
contribution of our study is to show that beyond these enhanced arousal or attention orienting 
effects following the detection of these adverse events, dedicated internal monitoring systems 
enable organisms to rapidly map specific affective values (either negative or positive) onto 
self-generated actions (either incorrect or correct). Indirect evidence for this idea was already 
provided by earlier ERP studies showing that the rapid processing and monitoring of 
response errors involved an emotional component that might be altered in (trait) anxiety or 
negative affect (Aarts & Pourtois, 2010; Hajcak et al., 2004). The results of the present study 
add to the literature that this mechanism appears to operate along a genuine valence 
dimension, which is not restricted to errors or a specific class of deviant outcomes (De Bruijn 
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et al., 2009). Hence, ERP measurements used in combination with the present evaluative 
priming experimental design might stimulate future studies exploring the functional meaning 
of early error-related ERP components (including the ERN and Pe). In addition to showing 
that actions performed during a simple Go/noGo task are actually quickly evaluated as 
negative or positive, our results suggest that this affective marking of the action functions at 
an abstract level of action representation, as opposed to being bound to a specific motor 
output or command. The latter conclusion is supported by the fact that the exact same key 
presses were performed for correct (either Fast or Slow Hits) and incorrect actions (FAs) 
during our Go/noGo task. This abstract online affective appraisal of the action may in fact 
concern goal conduciveness (Frijda, 1987; Scherer, 1984, 1988), that is, an evaluation of 
whether an action is conducive (positive/Fast Hits) or obstructive (negative/FAs) for reaching 
the goals set out by the Go/NoGo task.  
We hypothesize that the affective value of an action is determined primarily based on its 
perceived goal conduciveness. A response error is a goal obstructive event, while a correct 
response (fast hit) is deemed goal conducive. Appraisal theories of emotion (Scherer, 1988) 
postulate that these goal-obstructive events have the propensity to acquire a negative 
connotation, and symmetrically goal conducive events acquire a positive valence. Further 
studies are needed to confirm that these specific appraisal checks are causally related to the 
expression of the evaluative priming effect found here for self-generated actions. 
Alternatively, response errors may be seen as a special instance of conflict, occurring 
between the actual and the post-correcting response (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & 
Cohen, 2001). In a recent study based on a similar evaluative priming paradigm, conflict 
produced by incongruent Stroop stimuli was shown to be more negative compared to non-
conflict (i.e., congruent) Stroop stimuli (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012). Hence, it is possible 
that response errors evoke negative reactions because they involve conflict. However, more 
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research is needed before it can be decided whether response errors and incongruent Stroop 
stimuli are evaluated as negative based on similar or different processes.  
In our study, correct inhibitions (i.e., not responding to noGo stimuli) did not produce any 
evaluative priming effect. Schacht, Nigbur and Sommer (2009) previously found that nogo 
stimuli (presumably goal obstructive events) were not associated with physiological reactions 
corresponding to the detection of valence-specific events. Moreover, the lack of evaluative 
priming for correct inhibitions (or rejections) could be explained by the fact that when 
participants were able to withhold responding on nogo stimuli, the presentation of the 
subsequent target word occurred at least 1800 ms later (1500 ms duration of the nogo 
stimulus plus the length of the SOA). These specific parameters were required to collect 
response errors on the same nogo stimuli. However, this interval was probably too long to 
enable an evaluative priming effect for correct inhibitions to take place.  
Likewise, no clear evaluative priming effect was found following slow hits in our study. 
This might be due to the fact that the valence of slow hits (unlike either fast hits or response 
errors) was somehow equivocal. It is important to realize that the go-nogo task involved both 
goals regarding the nature of the responses (i.e., whether to press) and the speed of the 
responses (i.e., to respond quickly). Whereas a slow hit meets the first goal, it does not meet 
the second goal. Note that the goal to respond quickly was not only stated in the instructions 
but also implied by the feedback they received during the task. The absence of evaluative 
priming for slow hits might thus have reflected the ambivalence that participants experienced 
toward these stimuli.  
For FAs, we not only observed evaluative priming but also post-error slowing (Laming, 
1979; Rabbitt, 1966) as indicated by slower evaluative categorizations following FAs than 
hits (either fast or slow). However, evaluative priming was still highly significant when 
controlling for this general post-error slowing effect (by including it as a covariate in the 
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statistical analyses), suggesting that these two effects (priming and slowing) may reflect 
different processes during action monitoring. Whereas post-error slowing likely deals with 
enhanced cognitive or attention control aimed at preventing errors to repeat over time 
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Notebaert et al., 2009), evaluative priming seems to reflect the online 
and internal tagging of a specific affective value (negative vs. positive) to a particular action 
(incorrect vs. correct). The notion that post-error slowing and evaluative priming presumably 
reflect different components of action-monitoring (e.g. enhanced cognitive or attentional 
control and genuine affective evaluation, respectively) is also supported indirectly by the 
differential modulatory effect of trait anxiety on these two components. Whereas the size of 
the evaluative priming effect did reliably correlate (negatively) with levels of trait anxiety (r 
= -.28, p < .05), no such relationship was found between anxiety and post-error slowing (r = -
.004, p = .98) even though evaluative priming and post-error slowing were clearly related to 
one another (r = .42, p = .001). This latter relationship between evaluative priming and post-
error slowing further suggests that the emotional tagging of the action may be boosted if 
more efforts are exerted to prevent errors to reoccur, consistent with recent theoretical 
accounts (see Verguts, Notebaert, Kunde, & Wuhr, 2011). More generally, our new results 
are compatible with recent neuroscience findings showing that not only cognitive control 
systems are involved in action monitoring (and they likely include regions of the dorsal ACC 
besides deeper dopaminergic midbrain structures; see Klein et al., 2007), but also emotion 
control systems (including the amygdala) play an important role in this process, at a similar 
early latency following action execution (see Pourtois et al., 2010). 
Functional properties of automatic evaluation of actions  
Another important new result of our study concerns the actual time-course of the action-
word evaluative priming effect. It is well established that especially at short intervals (SOA) 
between the prime and the target, a substantial priming effect is observed (Fazio et al., 1986; 
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Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2001). Here we found that the putative affective value of 
action influenced the subsequent evaluative categorization process only if the SOA was either 
300 ms or 600 ms. However, we did not find a similar evaluative priming effect with an SOA 
of 1000 ms, whereas previous studies with word primes failed to find an effect with SOAs 
longer than 300 ms. This discrepancy might be due to the task-relevance of the (action) prime 
in our experiments. More specifically, whereas the action primes in our experiments were 
self-generated and informative regarding performance on the Go/NoGo task, the prime words 
in previous studies were provided by the experimenter and essentially irrelevant for any task.  
Finally, we observed that the evaluative priming effect was clearly related to the level of 
trait anxiety of our participants, as the evaluative priming effect became smaller with 
increasing levels of trait anxiety. This finding is in accordance with results from evaluative 
priming studies using external stimuli as primes that already reported blunted priming effects 
in high anxious participants (Berner & Maier, 2004; Glaser & Banaji, 1999; Maier, Berner, & 
Pekrun, 2003). It is also consistent with previous action-monitoring studies which have 
shown that high trait anxious participants usually exhibit action monitoring deficits, as 
indicated by impairments to decode or read out the actual value of their actions using internal 
monitoring processes and swiftly relate it to (positive or negative) external performance 
feedback information presented in the environment (Aarts & Pourtois, under revision; Hajcak 
et al., 2003).Together, these results suggest that in high trait anxious individuals, the rapid 
attribution process linking a specific value (either positive or negative) to an action (either 
correct or not) may somewhat be impaired, such that their online and internal action 
monitoring processes can in turn only weakly prime the immediately following evaluative 
categorization process. Alternatively, high anxious participants may show less priming than 
low anxious participants if they have a bias to focus exaggeratedly their attention on internal 
representations (Eysenck, 1992; Muris, Roelofs, Rassin, Franken, & Mayer, 2005). However, 
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this alternative account appears unlikely because high anxious participants were as fast (non-
significant action type x word type x anxiety level interaction: F(2, 148) = 1.14, p > .10) and 
accurate (non-significant action type x word type x anxiety level interaction: F < 1) as low 
anxious participants in orienting towards the target word following the action. Likewise, high 
and low anxious participants emitted a similar number of FAs, t(74) = -1.36, p > .10, nor did 
they differ in response speed, t < 1, during the speeded Go/noGo task. Hence, the present 
results also suggest that our new action-word evaluative priming paradigm may be suited to 
reveal specific impairments in action-monitoring processes, such as observed in 
psychopathological conditions or in individuals with certain personality traits (e.g., enhanced 
levels of trait anxiety). 
It is important to note that in our analyses, we related trait anxiety to a compound RT 
measure of evaluative priming that was the average of the absolute priming effects for FAs 
and Fast Hits. We used this score because of evidence showing that modulatory effects of 
trait anxiety on (early) action monitoring processes are mostly generic (see Aarts & Pourtois, 
2010, 2012), and should thus apply to Fast Hits and FAs equally. When looking at each 
action type separately, we found a marginally significant correlation with anxiety following 
errors, r = -.24, p = .07, but a non-significant relationship following Fast Hits, r = -.08, p > 
.10. However, little can be concluded from these additional analyses because the lack of 
significance could be due to a lack of statistical power and because the two correlation 
coefficients did not differ significantly from each other, z = -.86, p >.10 
Conclusions 
The results of this study show, for the first time, that the valence of simple self-generated 
actions are swiftly appraised. Unwanted FAs made during a simple Go/noGo task are actually 
perceived as more negative events compared to Fast Hits, while the latter events are 
perceived as more positive than the former outcomes. This affective appraisal of the action is 
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in all likelihood based on the actual perceived goal conduciveness of the action, as achieved 
through a rapid and efficient internal action monitoring process. If a target word is presented 
within 600 ms following one of these two actions and shares the same intrinsic valence as the 
goal conducive or obstructive action, then participants are quicker and better at categorizing 
this word as either positive or negative, revealing a genuine action-word evaluative priming 
effect. No such effect is seen if 1000 ms elapses between the action and the onset of the target 
word, suggesting that this effect is short-lived and automatic. Finally, this effect is blunted in 
participants showing enhanced levels of trait anxiety, suggesting that (i) it is most likely the 
affective value of the action used as prime which is driving this strong evaluative priming 
effect; (ii) these participants have action monitoring difficulties in linking specific affective 
values (either positive or negative) to their self-generated actions (either correct or incorrect). 
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Figures caption 
 
Figure 1. Stimuli and task. On each trial, a black arrow was presented (either upright or 
inverted). After a variable interval of 1000-2000 ms, the black arrow turned either green or 
turquoise. Participants had to respond by pressing a button of the response box as fast as 
possible with their non-dominant hand only when the arrow became green and kept its initial 
orientation (A), but not otherwise (B). This first action was then followed (300 ms in 
Experiments 1-2, 600 ms in Experiment 3 or 1000 ms in Experiment 4) by either a positive or 
negative target word that had to be classified as either positive or negative by pressing one of 
two predefined keys on the response box using their dominant hand. After this emotional 
word categorization, participants received a general feedback about their performance for the 
two tasks for this specific trial. Accuracy regarding the speed for correct responses (on Go 
trials) was determined based on a stringent procedure and response deadline (see Methods). 
 
Figure 2. Mean RTs (+ 1 standard error of the mean (SEM) for bars) for correct evaluative 
categorizations as a function of prime type (FA, Fast Hit or Slow Hit) and word type 
(Negative or Positive Words) in (A) Experiment 1 (SOA = 300ms), (B) Experiment 2 (SOA 
= 300 ms), (C) Experiment 3 (SOA = 600 ms) and (D) Experiment 4 (SOA =1000ms). * p< 
.05. 
 
Figure 3. Mean accuracy (+ 1 standard error of the mean (SEM) for bars) for evaluative 
categorization as a function of prime type (FA, Fast Hit or Slow Hit) and word type 
(Negative or Positive Words) in (A) Experiment 1 (SOA = 300ms), (B) Experiment 2 (SOA 
= 300 ms), (C) Experiment 3 (SOA = 600 ms) and (D) Experiment 4 (SOA =1000ms). * p< 
.05. 
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Figure 4. Significant negative correlation between evaluative priming effect [measured as the 
difference in RT latency between incongruent trials (i.e., FAs-Positive and Fast Hits-
Negative) and congruent trials (i.e., FAs-Negative and Fast Hits-Positive)] and levels of trait 
anxiety (measured using a standard questionnaire, see Methods). This correlation was 
calculated for participants of Experiments 1-3 together where a significant evaluative priming 
effect was evidenced. 
